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Abstract. The era of Internet of Things (IoT) being a combination of various
networking and computing technologies already in a state of growth that introduces
a new age of data aggregation mechanism and ubiquitous connectivity among
physical objects. However, the most of the cyber threats still remain unsolved and
may create huge impact on our lives. One of the possible major changes in impact
landscape is the imminent physical results of cyber threats as IoT technologies
enable closer interactions between humans and information systems. Although the
cyber threats to critical infrastructures have been highly considered by the cyber
security community, the cases with catastrophic physical impacts are rare which
means the impact posture has not exactly shifted from information centric impacts
to physical ones. However, widespread usage of IoT technologies have the potential
to accelerate this shift which may bring the threat of cyber terrorism into the picture.
This paper provides a preliminary comparison of a typical IoT application in health
area with an industrial control system (ICS) in order to show that IoT applications
are required to be deeply assessed as terrorists may attack them with easy-toimplement cyberattacks for the purpose of creating physical harm.
Keywords. Internet of Things, cyberterrorism, critical infrastructures

1.

Introduction

Internet of things in the simplest of terms can be referred to as the connection of things
or objects over the internet. It is a major concept in technological revolution that is set
to leap frog the current internet infrastructure concept with a more advanced computing
network where all the physical objects around us can be uniquely identifiable and
ubiquitously connected to one another [1]. One of the keys to ensuring internet of things
is the combination of different technologies among several billions of objects such as the
internet (including wireless technologies and Bluetooth), RFID sensors, Near Field
Communication and infra-red etc.

Despite the enormous advantages and perceived ease of life, there exist challenges
and threats this comfort can pose. It is already identified that some challenges such as
improper authentication mechanism currently present in RFID, tag cloning, wireless
technologies being more vulnerable to hacks including eavesdropping and excess noise
signals can cause RF Jamming [2]. Intelligent transport systems are already present in
smart cities, wearable devices in hospitals, smart sensors for braking system in
automobiles. Next maybe a connection between a refrigerator and a mobile device, smart
environment, smart cooking utensils that will perceive and smell. Over reliance and the
perceived implication of IoT in the future will mean that the current threat perception
established for the existing technologies needs to be channeled towards securing the IoT
technologies.
There is still no general definition for cyberterrorism, but it can be characterized as
the use of cyber means to create havoc that can lead to the crippling of a nation’s critical
infrastructure such as power grid, air traffic control system, banking and military
systems, health systems and in turn resulting to violence, fear and loss of life and
property. The concept of cyberterrorism underlines the involvement of a non-state actor
that is a group or an individual carrying out cyber attacks [3]. Till date an official
cyberterrorism act has not been confirmed anywhere around the world [4].
From the technical point of view, major requirement of a cyberterrorism activity is
creating a physical harm with cyber means. Stuxnet and Ukrainian power outage cases
showed the possible destruction and disruption consequences of cyber attacks although
they have not been classified as cyberterrorism acts due to the fact that threat actors
behind the incidents are likely to be state-sponsored rather than non-state groups. These
cases, however, showed that physical harm by cyber attack is possible and raised the
question whether there exists a terrorist organization that may have willingness and
capability to utilize such kind of cyber means. The most prevailing prediction is that the
terrorist organizations have not sufficient technical capabilities for the realization of such
sophisticated attacks and other physical attack alternatives are cost effective than cyber
ones [5] [6].
Threat actors behave in a rational manner as they choose cost-effective methods
requiring less amount of efforts and cheaper equipment and try to minimize the
probability of being caught by law enforcement bodies or defenders. There occurs huge
number of actual cybercrime or cyber espionage incidents as criminals have identified
very easy ways for having economic gains and cyber espionage provides a safer method
for criminals or nation-sponsored groups. The common denominator of all these
incidents is that threat actors intend to create information-based damages on the target
information systems. On the other side, very limited cyber incidents with major physical
damage have happened although there exists widespread fears about the security of
critical infrastructures. Based on these facts, it can be derived that current cyber security
posture is mostly composed of threats having information-based rather than physicalbased impacts. Cyberterrorism threats may extend the threat landscape with the latter
category in case of any possible alterations in the cost-effective equilibrium. As IoT
applications increase the interaction between humans and information systems, their
security vulnerabilities may enable terrorist organizations to conduct easier attacks with
physical impacts. The studies in the literature analyze the likelihood of cyberterrorism

threats according to the context of critical infrastructures and come up with the
conclusion that cyber mean is not a cost-effective attack method [4, 5, 6]. IoT
applications, however, have not been analyzed in their specific application context from
the cyberterrorism point of view.
This study provides a preliminary comparison between a sample IoT application and
a industrial control system (ICS), a typical information system in critical infrastructures,
in order to show that IoT applications may change the cost-effective equilibrium for
cyberterrorism threats. A smart healthcare system is chosen as an IoT application in the
study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of cyber
incidents that have occurred or may likely occur in in health sector particularly in a smart
healthcare systems. Section 3 gives information about the major incidents with
significant physical results in various critical infrastructures. The comparison of both
systems is given in section 4.. Section 5 evaluates the comparison from the
cyberterrorism perspective. The conclusion is presented in section 6.

2.

Cyber Threats to Smart Healthcare Systems

According to the 2016 internet security threat report by Symantec [7], the health services
sector remains the most breached industry sub sector in terms of the number of incidents
occurred. Just recently in 2015, over 80 million patient records were stolen by a
hacktivist group from a leading health care facility in the United States [8]. Health data
is considered as more valuable than credit card numbers in black market and the
resiliency level of relevant systems is lower than the systems in similar sectors such as
financial and retail which means health sector is one of the important targets of cyber
criminals who are seeking economic gains [9]. There has happened many ransomware
incidents in hospitals such as Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center paid 40
Bitcoins ($17,000), and Horry County school district in South Carolina paid $8500 to
decrypt a crypto ransomware [10]. Although these attacks were not targeted towards
individual patients, paying the ransom meant they were significant situations for
hospitals as they rely on up-to-date information from patient records. Without quick
access to drug histories, surgery directives and other information, patient care can get
delayed or halted, which makes hospitals more likely to pay a ransom rather than risk
delays that could result in death and lawsuits.
While information-based damages of cyber threats is the current significant concern,
IoT applications in this field may cause physical-based consequences as they directly
interact with physical phenomenon related with humans. According to [11], of the 15
billion devices found within the IoT in 2015, 30.3% belong to healthcare which includes
electronic recordkeeping, portable health monitoring, pharmaceutical safeguards and the
remaining 69.7% were found elsewhere. This shows that millions of people are relying
on smart devices to keep up with their health status which means these devices can be an
important target for the cyber threat actors seeking ways to physically harm humans.

In 2007, a supposed attack on the United States vice president, Dick Cheney was
assumed to be prevented by disabling the wireless function of the implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs). The possibility of exploiting the device was further
confirmed by researchers at the University of Massachusetts, Harvard Medical School
and University of Washington who suggested a software radio-based attack was possible
[12]. Medical devices such as pacemakers, insulin pump, neuro-stimulators, and drug
delivery pumps are increasingly in demand to manage medical conditions. These devices
are mostly communicating via wireless technology and so are exposed to cyber threats.
In 2014, the United States Homeland Security pointed out two threat scenarios. One was
instructing insulin pumps to overdose a patient with drugs and the other was to control
pacemakers to perform battery draining operations that would result to loss of pacing
output without warning [13]. An attack also demonstrated in [14] also showed how
insulin pumps could be remotely turned off and also changing the device configurations
without the patients’ knowledge.
Doctors are being trusted by their patients when they administer drugs. This same
trust is established when a smart health system administers drug to a remote patient.
Suppose a smart health system that returns drug prescription to a patient were to be
threatened by a man in the middle attack. A remote attacker could intercept data and
return a health threatening prescription and thousands of patients’ lives could be
endangered due to intentional medication errors. The use of computerized drug
dispensaries can cause havoc and possible death of patients [15].
Although, recent cyber-attacks on health systems has been for the purpose of
copying patients health records for monetary gain, there is a possibility to further extend
the attack by terrorists to jeopardize the patients safety. Copying patients’ records from
a directory gives the terrorist an idea of what to modify in the system that may take the
doctor a long time to detect. Doctors rely on records in treating patients and so a modified
record used to treat patients could have a long standing effect of the patients’ health.
Lives could be lost in the process. It is also possible for a terrorist to manipulate the
functions of a sensor by an easy attack that deceives the user into thinking the sensor is
functioning effectively and then passes malicious data [16]. Another danger in use of
IoT in healthcare system is in the use of the automated medical devices itself in
performing daily medical operations. Most of these devices are known to have loopholes
that provides the opportunity to be controlled from remote locations by attackers. As
reported in [17], zeus and citadel malwares were discovered in an x-ray system, a blood
gas analyzer and a PACS (Picture Archive and Communications System) which left
backdoors that basically provided remote access and control. This is extremely
detrimental to the safety and well-being of patients and in a situation where the primary
goal of the cyber terrorist is to cause harm to human lives, a resulting death is possible.

3.

Cyber Threats to ICSs

Industries before the evolution of automated control systems have relied heavily on
manual labor in carrying out daily industrial activities and controls. To make it easier,
ICSs provided the possibility to interact with physical processes by providing an

automated control from a remote location with the use of SCADA, distributed control
systems and programmable logic controllers [18]. This systems are present in wellknown critical infrastructures such as the electric power grids, oil and gas infrastructures,
industrial chemical and production plants, pipeline infrastructures [19] as well as in
discrete manufacturing which includes aerospace and automotive sectors [18].
Stuxnet can be considered as the most significant case that shows how a cyber threat
can harm a very strategic critical infrastructure, Iranian uranium enrichment plant in
Natanz, with a physical destruction. It is a very sophisticated malware that targets
industrial control system by modifying the codes of programming logic controllers with
the aim of causing fast-spinning in nuclear centrifuges and hiding these effects from
operators [20]. The complex attack vector includes windows and PLC rootkits, zero-day
vulnerabilities, compromised digital certificates, command control infrastructure and
antivirus evasion techniques [21]. Besides these advanced technical methods, collection
of detailed intelligence about the industrial control systems and a testing environment
having similar hardware, software and industrial equipment are highly required to
conduct such a highly complicated cyber attack. Only the state-based actors which have
advanced technical and intelligence capabilities can be the origins of these threats.
Critical infrastructures and sectors are dependent on the power grid for proper
functioning which means they can be primary targets as in the Ukrainian power grid
cyber-attack. On December 23rd 2015, the Ukrainian power grid was attacked from a
remote network point that resulted in disconnecting about 230,000 people from the power
source after an infiltration into the SCADA system [22]. One part of the attack steps was
to disable the backup power source which was the Uninterruptible Power Supply [23].
Oil and gas pipeline systems under the control of an ICS could be physically
damaged by a cyber attack. A report in [24] stated an attack as far back as 1982 where
SCADA systems were used to increase the pressure of a liquid flow thereby causing a
burst that damaged the pipeline infrastructure. In the description of the attack, a Trojan
horse was used to initiate a major explosion of the trans-Siberian gas pipeline. The Trojan
horse was installed after the pipeline control system was hijacked and was used to
increase the usual pressure leading to an explosion. It is argued that the attack was known
as the first cyber-attack causing external physical effect on an oil and gas operation [24].
However, it is not clear whether such incident happened as there is no any media report
from 1982 and former officials of Soviet Union denies the incident [25].

4.

Comparison of Smart Healthcare and ICS

In this section, smart healthcare and ICSs are compared with each other from the
perspective of ongoing organizational practices in the relevant business sectors and
actual technical characteristics of both systems as cyber security is a matter of
organizational and technical aspects. The main aim is to evaluate the factors that may
influence the required sophistication level of threat actors and the amount of resources
for conducting the cyber attacks with major physical impacts.
The security and safety approaches of business sectors have different variations. The
sectors of many critical infrastructures such as energy and transportation share a

profound safety culture. Although ICSs have not been designed and developed with
resiliency against cyber threats, safety standards and practices have addressed many
human errors, system failures and environmental threats in the related sectors. This
common safety culture is supported by effective organizational measures like detailed
contingency plans, operative maintenance procedures and effective auditing activities.
Health sector is lack of similar standards and organizational practices. Privacy culture in
this sector can be considered as an advantage when compared to critical sectors but
privacy practices mostly deal with the regulation and management of intentional
information sharing activities between relevant parties which causes a loss of focus on
fighting with cyber threats. From technical point of view, in critical sectors, safety
standards may assist to eliminate some system failures and human errors which may
otherwise make the attacks easier. Increased organizational capabilities may at least
enable them to effectively deal with incidents after they happen.
A typical network topology of a critical infrastructure is composed of mainly two
major networks, enterprise network and industrial control network. Enterprise network
is the one that highly interacts with Internet as it includes the common network services
such as e-mail and web servers, other main assets like database servers and user
computers.
Industrial control network consists of master terminal unit (MTU) that runs a
SCADA system and carries out the central control function for entire industrial
processes. Programmable logic controllers (PLC) and remote terminal units (RTU)
distributed to the different parts of a critical infrastructure collects data from sensors and
field devices, convey it to MTU and relays the control commands of MTU to those
devices. Enterprise network is separated from Internet and industrial control network
with firewalls. MTU and PLCs/RTUs are located in a wide area networks which use
dedicated lines rather than Internet. On the other side, in a smart healthcare system,
sensors deployed in different formats such as wearable device or a component of mobile
phone obtain data from individuals and send it to a central database of a hospital.
Although similar type of data exchange between sensors and command control units
take place in both industrial control and healthcare systems, the interfaces of healthcare
systems are more exposed to attacks coming from Internet. Data between industrial field
devices and the SCADA system is sent over a dedicated network rather than a public
network such as the internet as shown in Figure 1. This is in contrast with communication
in the smart healthcare systems where data is forwarded over Internet via wireless or
cellular networks. In order to compromise the industrial control network, an attacker is
required to have foothold in the enterprise network and then attack to endpoints, MTU
and RTUs/PLCs, or manipulate the data communication between these parties. In a
healthcare system, however, communication parties and the data traffic are directly
exposed to Internet based threats. The data collection part is integrated to insecure home
networks where attackers can take advantage of many easily exploitable vulnerabilities
in those networks. The command control and data storage functions are performed by the
systems in health organizations of a sector having many security breaches [7]. As the
data flow occurs over Internet, this system is more vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle
attacks. Abovementioned architecture difference shows that healthcare systems can be
compromised by the attackers with lower sophistication levels.

Figure 1. Comparison of communication in smart health systems and SCADA network

Smart healthcare systems uses various devices that utilize a combination of several
technologies such as sensors, actuators, RFID, bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, ethernet,
GSM/UMTS, mobile aggregators (PDAs, mobile phones), databases and cloud servers
[26] with each having existing security issues. This susceptibility makes it easier to
initiate an attack since several technologies can lead to many vulnerabilities. Health
devices do not require a lot of sophistication to be attacked [27]. It was seen how patients
who thought their insulin pumps weren’t functioning as they wanted, went online to
search for the hard coded authorization credentials, logged in to the devices and then
increased the dosage. They later had issues with their respiratory system [27].
Integration of different technologies requires evaluation of the whole system from
an interoperability point of view. Apart from the existence of individual vulnerabilities
in each system component, lack of interoperability may create additional security burden
especially on the data collection part of a smart healthcare system. IoT applications in
healthcare suffers from many interoperability problems [28]. On the other side, in spite
of existing problems in industrial control networks, interoperability has been addressed
by the safety community for a longer time than the recently developed IoT community.
If the existing vulnerabilities in IoT devices are considered together with the increased
susceptibility of healthcare systems to internet-based attacks, interoperability problem
may act as a multiplier effect on the system weaknesses.
Malicious actors utilize social engineering techniques as an initial penetration vector
in their attacks such as in their spear phishing campaigns. The improvement of user
awareness is the main countermeasure against these type of attack methods. Customers
are not directly interact with ICSs, only a particular set of staff deals with them whereas
in smart healthcare systems, customers have main roles in the system. In a critical
infrastructure, an attacker can get a foothold in the enterprise network with a spear

phishing attempt but he is also required to penetrate into industrial control network. An
attacker can reach to the same goal with an easier method in a healthcare system.
Although lower user awareness level is still an important problem in critical
infrastructure companies, it is more problematic in healthcare systems as the customers
are at the core of applications. Critical infrastructure companies can apply strict internal
security practices, procedures and technological solutions to tighten the security within
their premises and conduct user awareness campaign for their staff but it is more difficult
to take the same actions against customers of a smart healthcare system.
Critical infrastructures have different systems that monitor the ongoing industrial
processes and environmental factors. In cases of process anomalies, this advanced
monitoring capability, which is mostly complemented by well-developed maintenance
procedures, enables maintenance and other technical staff to intervene into the problem
in their earlier stages after physical consequences start to be appear. Unless monitoring
capability is compromised, a cyber threat with physical damage can be detected and a
maintenance or recovery procedure can reduce the consequences. In a smart healthcare
system, additional monitoring capabilities do not generally exist due the system
simplicity or if they exist, they can be easily compromised by attackers. The
consequences of attacks can be imminent so that a possible physical effect of a
cyberattack cannot be easily recovered. In critical infrastructures, recovery methods
based on manual controls may be alternative options for limiting the damage as it
happened in mass power outage case in Ukraine.
5.

Evaluation of Comparison Results

The above preliminary comparison between smart healthcare and ICSs shows that
such an IoT implementation can be compromised by cyber attacks requiring less
sophistication and resources. Although ICSs also benefit from IoT technologies for the
improvement of their functionalities, the main perspective in the comparison is that many
IoT applications such as smart healthcare application enable humans to directly interact
with information systems in more uncontrolled environments which may lead to extend
current cyber threat posture with threats creating physical-based impacts.
State-sponsored groups can be interested in conducting cyber attacks with physicalbased impacts for sabotage purposes as Stuxnet and Ukrainian mass power outage cases
clearly demonstrated. These groups may acquire required sophistication level and find
relevant resources. As the anonymity of an espionage activity and safety of spies are
significant concerns for states, cyber means can be an effective method when compared
to other methods.
Cyberterrorism threat, however, is highly contested issue. It is argued that terrorists
prefer physical attacks as they require lower sophistication levels and less resources. The
other main argument is that cyber attacks are not suitable for creation of a widespread
fear due to their limited media impact [5]. Terrorist organizations, however, may try to
give a message to people that they are not even safe while sitting at their homes by
attacking to IoT applications such as smart healthcare system. They can plan to conduct
cyber attacks to different targets in addition to separate physical attacks within the same
time-frame in order to rise the level of fear. They may even want to strengthen the belief
of their members to the organization by demonstrating that they have also advanced

cyber capabilities which means internal politics of organization may be a primary reason
in some cases. It is probable that terrorist organizations may identify how to benefit from
the cyber capability once they acquire it.
Cost-benefit analysis of cyberterrorism activities have been done with the
consideration of critical infrastructures [4, 5, 6] . Although problems in critical
infrastructures may threaten the whole city, region or even state, the possibility of cyber
threat is very low due to the high sophistication need and ineffectiveness of attacks from
cost-benefit perspective. It means there exists a risk with enormous impact but very
small possibility. With the advent of IoT technologies, a new spectrum of systems have
been emerged that have different characteristics than the usual critical infrastructures.
The overall impact of a cyberterrorist activity on these systems may not be as high as the
impact on critical infrastructures, however they may be still reasonable target for
terrorists due to possible physical results. Abovementioned preliminary comparison
argues that IoT applications such as smart healthcare systems can be targeted by attackers
with less capability and resources. It is important to deeply analyze the situation and be
ready for the possible cyberterrorism threats.

6.

Conclusion and Future Work

In many studies, it is argued that cyber-attacks are not preferable tools for terrorists
to reach their main objectives of physical damage. Not having any reported cyber
terrorism incident supports this argument. However, the viability assessments of cyber
threats have been done according to the considerations of critical infrastructure
environments. On the other side, IoT technology which establishes high interactions
between humans and information systems has been adapted to provide many applications
in various areas of human lives. Cyber threats addressing these applications may cause
physical destruction. This paper presents a preliminary comparison of a sample IoT
application with a industrial control system to show that IoT applications can be an
important target for the cyber attacks of terrorists as they may require less sophistication
and resources
As a future work, cyber attacks to different IoT applications will be analyzed in
detail with attack tree method which can provide a coherent way for the analysis of
adversarial factors such as capability and resource requirements.
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